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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Contractual limitations of liability have their place in the law
as when the promisee accepts the additional risks and is compen-
sated for them. But the freedom of contract should not exist for
only one party to the contract.
DAVID A. IRVIN
Domestic Relations-Voluntary Nonsuit in Custody Action
In a civil action in North Carolina the plaintiff may obtain a
voluntary nonsuit if the defendant has not asserted some claim or
cross-action arising out of the same transaction entitling him to
affirmative relief.1 In Griffith v. Griffith,2 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has held that the plaintiff should be allowed a nonsuit
in a proceeding involving the custody of a child when the defendant
does not answer the complaint.
The plaintiff instituted an action for alimony without divorce
under section 50-16 of the General Statutes' and requested custody
'E.g., Ashley v. Jones, 246 N.C. 442, 98 S.E.2d 667 (1957); McLean
v. McDonald, 173 N.C. 429, 92 S.E. 148 (1917); Francis & Brother v.
W. J. & J. G. Edwards & Co., 77 N.C. 271 (1877). A counterclaim 'is
defined by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953) and is "broader in meaning
than set-off, recoupment, or cross-action, and includes them all, and secures
to defendant the full relief which a separate action at law, or a bill in
chancery, or a cross-bill would have secured on the same state of facts."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 200 N.C. 251, 253, 156 S.E. 515, 516 (1931).
The rule had a counterpart in equity where the plaintiff was not allowed to
have his rule dismissed when the defendant claimed a set-off. March v.
Thomas, 63 N.C. 87 (1868). The counterclaim must arise out of the same
transaction as the plaintiff's cause of action in order to bar the nonsuit.
Olmsted v. Smith, 133 N.C. 584, 45 S.E. 953 (1903). See generally 2
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1645 (2d ed.
1956).
2265 N.C. 521, 144 S.E.2d 589 (1965).
8 In a proceeding instituted under this section, the plaintiff or the
defendant may ask for custody of the children of said parties, either
in the original pleadings or in a motion in the cause. Whereupon, the
court may enter such orders in respect to said custody as might be
entered upon a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus issued for the
purpose of determining the custody of said children. Such request
for custody of the children shall be in lieu of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, but it shall be lawful for the custody of said children
to be determined upon a writ of habeas corpus, provided the petition
for said writ is filed prior to the filing of said pleadings or motion
for such custody in the cause instituted under this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1965). In addition to this statute, custody
may be determined in North Carolina by way of habeas corpus proceedings
when the parents are separated but not divorced under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
17-39 (1953); by habeas corpus proceedings generally under N.C. GEN.
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of the two children of the marriage. The defendant did not answer
the complaint, but appeared in court pursuant to a show cause order
and testified as a witness. The court found that each parent was a
suitable custodian for the children, but in their best interest ordered
that they be placed in the custody of the plaintiff.
The request for alimony pendente lite was denied, but the de-
fendant was required to pay 450 dollars per month for support of
the children and 500 dollars for attorney's fees.
After these orders had been entered, the plaintiff moved for a
voluntary nonsuit that was denied, and she appealed. The court
reversed the judgment, holding that since the defendant had asserted
no claim for affirmative relief, the nonsuit should have been allowed.
Section 50-16 authorizes the court to make orders respecting
custody "as might be entered upon a hearing on a writ of habeas
corpus" under section 17-39 where "at any time after the making of
such orders the court or judge may, on good cause shown, annul,
vary, or modify the same." Adjudications for custody are never
final,4 but the court retains jurisdiction until the child reaches his
majority.5 Another superior court may not alter the order, however,
unless a change in circumstances is shown.' To allow the plaintiff
STAT. § 17-39.1 (Supp. 1965)_; as an incident to a divorce action under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950); by the juvenile branch of the superior
court when neither of the parents is seeking custody under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-21 (1960); or by a domestic relations court under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7-103 (1953). See generally LEE, 3 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §
222 (3d ed. 1963); LIGON, NORTH CAROLINA CASES AND MIATERIALS ON
FAmILY LAW 203-13 (1962).
'Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964). Cf. Cleeland v.
Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958). There it was held that a
custody decree in another state does not preclude a North Carolina court
from determining custody rights. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C.
638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).
In Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956) the
plaintiff instituted a divorce action and filed a motion for custody of one of
the children. After receiving notice of the motion, the defendant took the
child out of the jurisdiction. The court held that since any proceeding
involving the custody of a child is in rem, the court is without power to
make an order awarding the child's custody if he is not within the juris-
diction. See generally 3 LEE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 226.
' Weddington v. Weddington, note 4 supra. Cf. Blankenship v. Blanken-
ship, note 4 supra, where it was held that the court in which an action for
alimony pendente lite is brought retains jurisdiction to award custody of
the children over another court in which the husband has brought an action
for absolute divorce.
'A judgment awarding custody is based upon the conditions found
to exist at the time it is entered. The judgment is subject to such
change as is necessary to make it conform to changed conditions when
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to take a voluntary nonsuit after a custody order has been made as
in the instant case is to contravene the policy of the statute, since
there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from trying another court
if he does not like the custody or other interlocutory orders of the
first. Meanwhile the ultimate status of the child has not been de-
termined and a showing of good cause or change in circumstances
will not be necessary since the nonsuit erases the proceedings of
the first court, including any orders requiring support of the child.
Our court in Cox v. Cox' held that in an action for absolute
divorce, the plaintiff could not take a voluntary nonsuit when the
defendant has filed an answer requesting custody of the child. The
opinion in the instant case made no reference to Cox, but presum-
ably the court would have distinguished the two cases on the grounds
that in Griffith there was no answer and, indeed, the defendant ad-
mitted in his testimony that his wife was a suitable custodian for
the children. This distinction may be more apparent than real. The
court in Cox and in other cases" has held that once jurisdiction is
invoked in a question of custody, the child becomes a ward of the
court and his welfare becomes of primary concern. Recognizing
the danger that the child, who has no one to represent his interests,
may become a pawn in the battle between his parents, the court is
sensitive to his well-being and becomes his champion.
It would seem that the basic policy considerations reflected in
the rule forbidding a voluntary nonsuit when the defendant requests
affirmative relief are present in a greater degree in a custody case.
A child, who unlike one of the parties cannot come back into court
in his own right, should have his custody determined in the original
action, subject only to a showing of changed circumstances as pro-
vided by statute. It should make no difference that there has been
no answer to the complaint, since it is the rights of the child that
are being protected.
In Caldwell v. Caldwell,' an action for divorce where custody
was not involved, our court said:
they occur. In a bitter controversy between separated parents over
the custody of children, one is usually dissatisfied with the award.
The aggrieved party, however, must appeal to the Supreme Court, or
must wait for a more favorable factual background in which to de-
mand another hearing by motion in the case.
Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 76, 145 S.E.2d 332, 335 (1965).
1246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957).
'E.g., Joyner v. Joyner, 256 N.C. 588, 591, 124 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1962).
p189 N.C. 805, 128 S.E. 329 (1925).
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The better rule seems to be that a motion by the plaintiff for
judgment dismissing his action for divorce upon a voluntary non-
suit will not be allowed by the court as a matter of right, but is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which will be
exercised in the interest not only of the plaintiff, but of the defen-
dant and the State. The State and defendant, each, have an inter-
est in the status of plaintiff and defendant, and the purpose of
an action for divorce is to change or alter this status.10
This position was labeled as dictum and the court reversed itself in
Scott v. Scott," a case cited as precedent for the decision in the
principal case. The Scott case did not involve custody, and even if
it be conceded that the court was justified in its conclusion that "in
the long view, we do not perceive that public policy requires that
divorce actions be excepted from the general rule with reference to
nonsuits,"' 2 the case furnishes 'no authority for a proceeding in-
volving custody. The court's jurisdiction to award custody is not
lost when a divorce is not granted under section 50-13,23 nor pre-
sumably when alimony pendente lite is denied under section 50-16.14
The plaintiff should not be allowed to destroy the court's jurisdic-
tion by taking a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right. The parties
should be permitted to get out of court if a reconciliation is achieved
and therefore a voluntary nonsuit should not be strictly prohibited,
but when a question of custody is to be decided, the interest of the
state is considerable, and it is to be hoped that the judge will be
given discretion to deny the motion when the welfare of the child
warrants doing so. 5
JOHN L. W. GARROU
'0 Id. at 812, 128 S.E. at 333.
1259 N.C. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478 (1963).
"Id. at 648, 131 S.E.2d at 482.
"Bunn v. Bunn 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).
"See 3 LEE, note 3 supra, § 222, at 11 n.20. The language of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1965) suggests that the determination of custody
rights is not dependent on a favorable ruling on the request for alimony
without divorce.
" Of the cases found in other jurisdictions that dealt with the question,
the most nearly in point is Ford v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 296, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 288 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). There plaintiff and defendant were
divorced, and the suit was for custody of the child. The defendant filed
a demurrer to the complaint and a motion for an order to pay attorney's
fees and costs. Thereafter the plaintiff requested a dismissal of the action,
and the defendant moved the court to vacate the dismissal and was success-
ful. The defendant then filed an answer and a cross-complaint by which
she sought to establish a Nevada decree as a domestic judgment. The
court held that "when the complaint was filed, the child for whose benefit the
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